War in Afghanistan

John McCain

Barack Obama

*Translation

McCain said in the second presidential debate that victory in Afghanistan means getting the support of Pakistan, in particular, the people of Waziristan, a mountainous region in the northwest where the Taliban have reportedly taken refuge. He would double the Afghan army to 160,000 troops and look to streamline the NATO command structure. He would pay for the troop increase by “establishing an international trust fund to provide long-term financing for the effort.” McCain would support a counterinsurgency effort, much like the one employed in Iraq. He would send at least three additional U.S. brigades to the country, about 15,000 soldiers. He believes the plans of Gen. David Petraeus would enable the Afghans to “feel secure, then lead normal, social, economic, political lives, the same thing that's happening in Iraq today.” In an editorial in Time, McCain said he would establish “an Afghanistan czar, … a highly respected national-security leader, based in the White House and reporting directly to the president, whose sole mission will be to ensure we bring the war to a successful end.” He would also appoint a special presidential envoy to work through disputes between Afghanistan and its neighbors.

In a July op-ed column in the New York Times, the Democrat said he would send at least two additional combat brigades, about 10,000 soldiers, to Afghanistan. “We need more troops, more helicopters, better intelligence-gathering and more nonmilitary assistance to accomplish the mission there,” he wrote. During the second presidential debate, Obama said he would call on the Iraqi government to take on more responsibility so that troops could be withdrawn from that country because the conflict in Afghanistan requires more troops. In responding to comments by Sherard Cowper-Coles, the British diplomatic leader in Afghanistan, that the country might need a dictator to be successful, Obama said “I don’t think (President Karzai) has to be a dictator. And we want a democracy in Afghanistan. But we have to have a government that is responsive to the Afghan people.” He also called for better relations with Pakistan by “encouraging democracy” and expanding nonmilitary aid to the country. Obama said this is key to getting Pakistan to “go after” Taliban and al Qaida militants in their country. Finally, he said if Pakistan is unable or unwilling to “take them out, then I think that we have to act, and we will take them out. We will kill bin Laden; we will crush al Qaida.”

“Afghanistan is an intensely regional, ethnic and sectarian war; and there are much more complex tribal divisions and interests than Iraq.” Putting more troops on the ground is only one part of a solution in Afghanistan. Any U.S. reinforcements must work with — not replace — NATO and allied forces in the country. One of the biggest shortages is the lack of qualified U.S. advisers for the county’s army and police forces, along with a shortage of civilian aid workers. “Virtually every military officer, civilian officer and intelligence officer who deals with Afghanistan realizes that the war not only is unwinnable on a purely military basis, it is probably unwinnable without basic changes in the role that the Pakistani government and its forces play in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Baluchi areas of Pakistan.” This is an Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict, so more troops for Afghanistan could impact only half the war. Governance in these regions is “weak to nonexistent” while al Qaida continues to build there. The United States needs a joint campaign plan that ties all of these elements together and outlines a detailed course of action, provides funding and includes ongoing looks at effectiveness. If the U.S. can be patient, and Pakistan resolves its internal power struggle, there will be long-term success against “a mix of small, extremist enemies” that are both weak and lack broad support. This is dependent on the next president being ready to act as soon as possible. From a commentary written by Anthony H. Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.